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OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is
intended to promote the amicable resolution of cases.
Although it usually serves its intended purpose, Rule 68
presents a trap for the unwary. This trap manifests itself most
frequently when a defendant erroneously believes that an
accepted Rule 68 offer of judgment finally resolves a civil
action, only to be assessed substantial attorney‟s fees and
costs thereafter by the court.
In this appeal, Plaintiff Roberto Lima argues that the
Rule 68 offer of judgment he accepted did not include
attorney‟s fees and costs. As in many cases, the question is
significant because counsel for Lima seek fees well in excess
of the value of his settled claims.

I
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A
The historical facts of this case are incidental to the
issue presented on appeal, so we summarize them only
briefly. In September 2007, a photographer working for
Lima‟s Portuguese-language newspaper, Brazilian Voice,
discovered and photographed a decomposed body covered by
debris in the Ironbound section of Newark, New Jersey.
Lima reported the incident to police and showed them the
crime scene. At the crime scene, two police officers allegedly
intimidated Lima and the photographer, seized the camera,
and ordered Lima not to publish any photographs of the
scene. At the precinct office, Lima gave police a statement
but refused to turn over the original photographs (though he
offered to make copies for them). Lima further alleged that
he was handcuffed and released from custody only after he
agreed to turn over all copies of the photographs. The police
then followed him to his office where they seized CDs
containing digital copies of the pictures.
In January 2008, Lima filed suit in New Jersey District
Court against the Newark Police Department and certain
police officers. He amended his complaint once to add an
additional officer, and then again, in January 2009, adding
Police Director Garry McCarthy, another officer, and a
Monell claim against the City of Newark (collectively,
Newark).
Lima‟s second amended complaint stated seven causes
of action arising under both federal and state law and
concluded with a “PRAYER FOR RELIEF” stating:
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully
requests judgment against the Defendants as
follows:
(a)

Compensatory and consequential
damages in an amount to be
determined at trial;

(b)

Punitive damages on all claims
allowed by law, in an amount to
be determined at trial;

(c)

Attorney‟s
fees
and
associated with this action;

(d)

Any further relief as this Court
deems just and proper and any
other relief as allowed by law.

costs

B
Before discovery commenced, and before filing his
second amended complaint, Lima offered to settle the case for
“$85,000, and [an] admission of the event; an apology; and
consent to training.” After some discovery, the filing of the
second amended complaint, further settlement negotiations,
and a failed attempt at mediation—during which Lima‟s
demand went as high as $150,000 and Newark‟s offer went as
high as $50,000—Newark made a Rule 68 offer of judgment
(Offer). The Offer was attached to a November 8, 2009 email
stating: “Attached is an Offer of Judgment from the City of
Newark and Garry McCarthy. The offer is, however, as to all
defendants and all claims. The City makes this offer with the
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intention and expectation that, if accepted, this litigation will
be resolved in its entirety.” The Offer itself stated:
Pursuant to Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, Defendants City of Newark
(and improperly pled “Newark Police
Department”), and Garry McCarthy, hereby
offers [sic] to allow Judgment to be entered
against these defendants in this action in the
amount of $55,000.00, including all of
Plaintiff‟s claims for relief against all
defendants, including those not represented by
this counsel. This offer of judgment is made for
the purposes specified in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 68, and is not to be construed as
either an admission that any of the defendants
are liable in this action, or that the Plaintiff has
suffered any damage. This Offer of Judgment
shall not be filed with the Court unless (a)
accepted or (b) in a proceeding to determine
costs (which includes counsel fees that could be
awarded pursuant to statute).
Lima timely accepted the Offer and simultaneously
filed a request for judgment seeking “judgment against
Defendants in the amount of $55,000, with costs to be taxed
by the Court upon application by Plaintiff pursuant to Rule
54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 42 U.S.C. §
1988.” Upon receiving Lima‟s acceptance of the Offer,
Newark promptly wrote to the Magistrate Judge assigned to
the case, stating:
Just to be clear, the Defendants‟ Offer of
Judgment was for „all of Plaintiff‟s claims
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against all defendants.‟ There should be no
confusion about any remaining claims, whether
for costs or anything else; no such claims
remain. But if there is any confusion, let me
clarify that the Defendants‟ Offer of Judgment
was not designed to expose the citizens of the
City of Newark to any further expense other
than the $55,000 offered.
If the Plaintiff intends to seek costs and
attorneys fees, the Defendants seek immediate
relief and clarification from Your Honor.
Lima‟s counsel responded the next day, countering Newark
by asserting: “The Offer and Plaintiff‟s Acceptance are
binding, so that the only remaining question for resolution is
the amount of costs and fees to which Plaintiff is entitled.”
After receiving the aforementioned correspondence,
the Magistrate Judge ordered counsel to meet and confer, but
they were unable to come to an agreement. Because the
parties could not resolve the dispute over fees without judicial
intervention, the District Court ordered briefing on the matter
and, on February 22, 2010, entered an order: (1) granting
Lima‟s “Request for Judgment in the amount of $55,000” and
(2) denying his “Request to File an Application for Attorneys‟
Fees . . . because . . . the Offer of Judgment included
attorneys‟ fees.” Lima v. Newark Police Dep’t, No. 08-426,
slip op. (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 2010) (Lima).
In support of its decision, the District Court reasoned
that “Newark was not silent as to costs, but rather used three
different phrases to state that the offer was a lump sum, single
offer to cover all claims in the case and end the litigation
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while specifically disclaiming any liability.” Id. at 2-3. The
three phrases the District Court found significant were:
(1) „Judgment to be entered against these
defendants in this action in the amount of
$55,000, including all of Plaintiff‟s claims for
relief against all defendants,‟ in the Offer of
Judgment, [which] explicitly covers Prayer for
Relief subpart (c) in the Complaint which
claims the following relief: „(c) attorney‟s fees
and costs associated with this action‟;
(2) „This . . . is not to be construed as either an
admission that any of the defendants are liable
in this action, or that the Plaintiff has suffered
any damage,‟ in the Offer of Judgment [, which]
is a statement that disclaims plaintiff as a
“prevailing
party”
under
Buckhannon
principles;
(3) „[I]f accepted, this litigation will be resolved
in its entirety,‟ in the email conveying the Offer,
[which] further confirms that Newark‟s offer
precludes additional litigation regarding
whether Plaintiff is a “prevailing party” to earn
an attorney‟s fee award;
Id. For these reasons, the District Court held that the “Offer
of Judgment, as accepted, is inclusive of costs and fees.” Id.
at 4.
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II
The District Court had jurisdiction over Lima‟s federal
claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction
over his state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Lima
timely appealed the final order of the District Court and we
have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1291.
“We have plenary review over both legal questions
regarding the interpretation of Rule 68 and the construction of
the offer of judgment.” Le v. Univ. of Pa., 321 F.3d 403,
406 (3d Cir. 2003).
III
A
Rule 68 permits a defendant to include all fees and costs in
an offer of judgment. The rule states, in relevant part:

(a) Making an Offer; Judgment on an
Accepted Offer.
More than 10 days before the trial
begins, a party defending against a claim may
serve on an opposing party an offer to allow
judgment on specified terms, with the costs then
accrued. If, within 10 days after being served,
the opposing party serves written notice
accepting the offer, either party may then file
the offer and notice of acceptance, plus proof of
service. The clerk must then enter judgment.
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FED. R. CIV. P. 68 (2009) (italics added).1
In Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1 (1985), the Supreme
Court explained that the phrase “with the costs accrued”
means that (1) where the underlying statute defines “costs” to
include attorney‟s fees (as § 1988 does), those fees are
included as costs for purposes of Rule 68, id. at 10, and (2)
defendants can make lump sum offers that do not distinguish
between the claim and the costs, id. at 6. The Court
explained:
The critical feature of [the portion of Rule 68
stating that a defendant may make an offer
“with costs then accrued”] is that the offer be
one that allows judgment to be taken against the
defendant for both the damages caused by the
challenged conduct and the costs then accrued.
In other words, the drafters‟ concern was not so
much with the particular components of offers,
but with the judgments to be allowed against
defendants. If an offer recites that costs are
included or specifies an amount for costs, and
the plaintiff accepts the offer, the judgment will
necessarily include costs; if the offer does not
state that costs are included and an amount for
costs is not specified, the court will be obliged
by the terms of the Rule to include in its
judgment an additional amount which in its
discretion, it determines to be sufficient to cover
the costs . . . .
1

Rule 68 was amended December 2009 to change the
timeframe from 10 to 14 days.
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Id. (italics in original, underline added).
In Le v. University of Pennsylvania, 321 F.3d 403 (3d
Cir. 2003), we had occasion to apply Marek to a Rule 68 offer
of judgment. There, we stated: “the Supreme Court . . . found
that „[a]s long as the offer does not implicitly or explicitly
provide that the judgment does not include costs‟ an offer is
valid and presumes the defendant will pay costs.” Id. at 409
(quoting Marek, 473 U.S. at 6) (alteration in original).
Accordingly, we held that a Rule 68 offer of judgment “for
the total amount of $50,000, plus costs then accrued”
unambiguously stated an offer of $50,000 plus costs to be
determined by the court because the “plain language of the
offer dictates the result,” even though another part of the offer
stated that “„the offer [of $50,000 plus costs] shall represent
and fix the total liability of the [defendants] for any and all of
plaintiff‟s loss, claims, damages, costs, attorneys‟ fees, or any
other amounts or expenses recoverable, or potentially
recoverable, in this action.‟” Id. (alterations in original).
Le‟s holding was based on Marek and on principles
embodied in our prior cases interpreting settlement offers,
decided both before and after Marek. Before Marek, we held
that a suit for attorney‟s fees is foreclosed only when
expressly stipulated in the settlement agreement: “If the
parties cannot agree on counsel fees and the losing party
wishes to foreclose a suit . . . for attorneys fees, it must insist
that a stipulation to that effect be placed in the settlement
agreement.” El Club Del Barrio, Inc. v. United Cmty. Corps.,
735 F.2d 98, 101 (3d Cir. 1984). We rejected a “silence
equals waiver” rule and held that “extrinsic evidence such as
the course of negotiations” is irrelevant. Id. at 100. See also
Torres v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 189 F.3d 331, 333 (3d Cir.
1999) (applying the same rule post-Marek).
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After Marek was decided, we considered whether a
plaintiff was entitled to attorney‟s fees under § 1988
following a non-Rule 68 settlement offer. Ashley v. Atl.
Richfield Co., 794 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1986). In Ashley we
noted:
Where the plaintiff does so prevail, however, in
the absence of an express waiver, she will be
deemed to have retained her statutory right to an
award of reasonable attorney‟s fees. Therefore,
where a defendant seeks to settle its total
liability on a claim, it shall be incumbent upon
the defendant to secure an express waiver of
attorney‟s fees. Silence will not suffice.
Id. at 138-39. Although the settlement offer in Ashley did
disclaim liability for “costs,” we held that it was not
controlled by Marek because the settlement offer was not
made pursuant to Rule 68. Id. at 140-41 (citing Marek, 473
U.S. at 6).
Similarly, in Torres we held that a plaintiff was
entitled to attorney‟s fees after a non-Rule 68 settlement
agreement, despite an extensive release of
all claims, charges, or demands asserted or
assertable in the Pending Lawsuit, and all
claims, charges, or demands arising from or
relating to Plaintiff's relationship of any kind
with the Released Parties, including without
limitation any rights or claims Plaintiff may
have under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, as amended, and the Civil Rights Act of
1991.
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189 F.3d at 333. We determined that this language did not
“„clearly‟ waive plaintiff‟s right to attorney‟s fees.” Id. at
333 n.3 (quoting El Club Del Barrio, 735 F.2d at 99). We
also held that the “clear import of El Club Del Barrio and
Ashley is that it does not matter whether the parties discussed
the issue of attorney‟s fees or believed the settlement
agreement waived such a claim. All that matters is whether
the agreement expressly stipulates that the prevailing party‟s
claim for fees is waived. If it does not, then the claim
survives.” Id. at 334.
Our sister courts of appeals have read Marek to require
that a Rule 68 offer of judgment must explicitly state that
costs are included; otherwise those costs must be determined
by the court. See McCain v. Detroit II Auto Fin. Ctr., 378
F.3d 561, 564 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that defendant‟s
“silence on the subject of costs in its Rule 68 offer means that
true costs are recoverable,” although attorney‟s fees were not
recoverable because the operative statute did not classify
them as costs); Nordby v. Anchor Hocking Packaging Co.,
199 F.3d 390, 391-93 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[A]mbiguities in Rule
68 offers are to be resolved against the offerors,” but the
instant offer—for “judgment in the amount of $56,003.00
plus $1,000 in costs as one total sum as to all counts of the
amended complaint” was unambiguous and therefore
included costs and fees.); Webb v. James, 147 F.3d 617, 622
(7th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he effect of Marek is clear. Rule 68
offers must include costs. If the offer is silent as to costs, the
court may award an additional amount to cover them. Where
costs are defined in the underlying statute to include
attorney‟s fees, the court may award fees as part of costs as
well.”); Erdman v. Cochise County, 926 F.2d 877, 879-81
(9th Cir. 1991) (holding that a defendant‟s drafting error
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failing to explicitly include fees would be held against it and
plaintiff could seek additional award of fees); Arencibia v.
Miami Shoes, Inc., 113 F.3d 1212, 1214 (11th Cir. 1997)
(“The Supreme Court has held that when a Rule 68 offer is
silent as to costs, the district court should award appropriate
costs in addition to the amount of the offer.”).
In sum, a valid Rule 68 offer of judgment necessarily
includes costs and attorney‟s fees either explicitly or
implicitly. When the costs are stated explicitly in the offer of
judgment, the offeror is not subject to any additional liability.
When, however, the offer of judgment is silent as to fees and
costs, they must be fixed by the court after the offer of
judgment is accepted. Extrinsic evidence of the parties‟
subjective intent is not admissible to determine whether a
Rule 68 offer of judgment includes costs.
B
Here, the District Court found that Newark‟s Offer
included attorney‟s fees because it “was not silent as to
costs.” In concluding that Newark “used three different
phrases to state that the offer was a lump sum, single offer to
cover all claims in the case and end the litigation while
specifically disclaiming any liability,” the District Court was
influenced by improper considerations and misread the plain
language of the Offer. Lima, No. 08-426 at 3. Although the
District Court‟s conclusion is understandable inasmuch as it
is possible that Newark intended attorney‟s fees to be
included in the Offer, we hold that the District Court
committed an error of law because the Offer did not explicitly
include attorney‟s fees or costs.
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As an initial matter, we note that the District Court
erred by considering evidence extrinsic to the Offer in
violation of El Club Del Barrio, 735 F.2d at 100, and by
considering the subjective intentions of the parties in
violation of Torres, 189 F.3d at 333. The District Court
found that the phrase “„if accepted, this litigation will be
resolved in its entirety,‟ in the email conveying the Offer,
further confirms that Newark‟s offer precludes additional
litigation regarding whether Plaintiff is a „prevailing party‟ to
earn an attorney‟s fee award.” Lima, No. 08-426 at 3
(emphasis added). This was error because an email to which
the Offer is attached is extrinsic to the Offer; it does not
inform whether the Offer itself explicitly includes fees and
costs. El Club Del Barrio, 735 F.2d at 100.
In fact, the complete sentence from the email
conveying the offer—“The City makes this offer with the
intention and expectation that, if accepted, this litigation will
be resolved in its entirety.”—describes Newark‟s “intention
and expectation,” not a term of the Offer. The parties‟
subjective intentions and expectations are not proper factors
to consider when interpreting an offer of judgment. See
Torres, 189 F.3d at 334 (The “clear import of El Club Del
Barrio and Ashley is that it does not matter whether the
parties discussed the issue of attorney‟s fees or believed the
settlement agreement waived such a claim. All that matters is
whether the agreement expressly stipulates that the prevailing
party‟s claim for fees is waived. If it does not, then the claim
survives.”). For the same reason, we give no weight to
Newark‟s argument that various Newark principals filed
affidavits stating that they intended fees to be included, while
Lima did not file any affidavits as to his subjective
understanding of the offer at the time he accepted it.
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Appellee Br. 28-30 (“[Q]uite simply, neither Plaintiff nor his
counsel ever said anything about what they believed the Offer
of Judgment meant, or did not mean. No one ever said they
believed it included costs, or that it did not include costs.”).
Neither the email accompanying the Offer nor the affidavits
can be considered because they are extrinsic evidence of the
subjective intentions of a party.
Perhaps influenced by these improper considerations,
the District Court erred in its reading of the Offer. The Court
determined that the phrase “„Judgment to be entered against
these defendants in this action in the amount of $55,000,
including all of Plaintiff‟s claims for relief against all
defendants,‟ in the Offer of Judgment, explicitly covers
Prayer for Relief subpart (c) in the Complaint which claims
the following relief: „(c) attorney‟s fees and costs associated
with this action.‟” Lima, No. 08-426 at 3. Thus, the District
Court found that “claims for relief” included the “Prayer for
Relief,” even though the “Prayer for Relief” was not part of a
particular claim or count in the complaint.
As a matter of law, it cannot be said that the
ambiguous, catchall phrase “all of Plaintiff‟s claims for
relief” explicitly covers attorney‟s fees and costs. For that
reason, it does not fulfill the requirement established by El
Club Del Barrio, Marek, and Torres. Nor is it the most
reasonable reading of the phrase in light of Supreme Court
precedent. A request for attorney‟s fees under § 1988 is
collateral to the main cause of action and attorney‟s fees
cannot “fairly be characterized as an element of „relief‟
indistinguishable from other elements.” White v. N.H. Dep’t
of Emp’t Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 452 (1982). “Unlike other
judicial relief, the attorney‟s fees allowed under § 1988 are
not compensation for the injury giving rise to an action.
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Their award is uniquely separable from the cause of action to
be proved at trial.” Id.
The District Court also found that the phrase “„[t]his . .
. is not to be construed as either an admission that any of the
defendants are liable in this action, or that the Plaintiff has
suffered any damage,‟ in the Offer of Judgment is a statement
that disclaims plaintiff as a „prevailing party‟ under
Buckhannon principles.” Lima, No. 08-426 at 3; see
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. DHHS, 532
U.S. 598, 603 (2001). The District Court reasoned from this
standard disclaimer of liability that “an application for
attorneys‟ fees in this case would require significant
additional litigation to determine whether, under the standards
developed in [Buckhannon] and Truesdell v. Philadelphia
Housing Authority, 290 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2002), Lima would
be considered a „prevailing party‟ entitled to an award of
attorneys‟ fees in this case.” Lima, No. 08-426 at 4. In
making this determination, the District Court once again
appears to have been influenced by Newark‟s intentions—
namely to conclude the litigation—from which it reasoned
that Newark could not have meant to leave open the
possibility of further litigation regarding Lima‟s status as a
prevailing party. Those intentions should not have been
considered, and absent that consideration, we cannot say that
the disclaimer of liability was an explicit statement that the
Offer included fees and costs.
A “„prevailing party‟ is one who has been awarded
some relief by the court.” Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603. “To
be eligible to make a prevailing-party claim under § 1988, the
plaintiff must, „at a minimum, ... be able to point to a
resolution of the dispute which changes the legal relationship
between itself and the defendant.‟”
Singer Mgmt.
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Consultants, Inc. v. Milgram, --- F.3d ----, 2011 WL
2342733, at *4 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Tex. State
Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782,
792 (1989)). “The fact that [a party] prevailed through a
settlement rather than through litigation does not weaken her
claim to fees.” Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980).
“Nothing in the language of § 1988 conditions the District
Court‟s power to award fees on full litigation of the issues or
on a judicial determination that the plaintiff‟s rights have
been violated.” Id. Whether one was the prevailing party
depends on whether the resolution resulted in a “judicial
action,” Singer, --- F.3d ----, 2011 WL 2342733, at *4, that
effected a “material alteration of the legal relationship of the
parties,” Truesdell, 290 F.3d at 163 (quoting Tex. State
Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782,
792-93 (1989)). “„[T]he degree of the plaintiff‟s overall
success goes to the reasonableness of the award . . . not to the
availability of a fee award vel non.‟” Truesdell, 290 F.3d at
166 (quoting Tex. State Teachers, 489 U.S. at 782). Thus, the
Offer‟s disclaimer of liability does not establish that it
included fees and costs, particularly because Lima‟s status as
a putative prevailing party was to be made after the District
Court determined whether the Offer included fees, and should
not have been considered in making that determination in the
first instance. Id.
Here, the Offer was valid and was silent as to fees and
costs. That fact begins and ends our analysis. In interpreting
a Rule 68 offer of judgment, courts must not consider
extrinsic evidence or the intentions of the parties. Nor can
they allow their awareness of such irrelevant facts to
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influence their interpretations of the plain language of the
Offer.2

2

Newark argues that even if the District Court erred,
Lima waived his right to appeal because he invited the error.
After the Offer had been accepted, and while the parties were
disputing the issue of attorney‟s fees, they also disagreed
about whether Lima should undergo an independent medical
examination. In a joint letter regarding re-scheduling the
independent medical examination, Lima wrote:
Plaintiff will receive either (a) $55,000 in toto
or (b) $55,000 plus reasonable costs and
attorneys [sic] fees. Though Defendants offered
to withdraw the Offer following Plaintiff‟s
acceptance, Plaintiff declined, willing to accept
either possibility as ordered by the Court.
The doctrine of “invited error” refers to “[a]n error that a
party cannot complain of on appeal because the party,
through conduct, encouraged or prompted the trial court to
make the erroneous ruling.” BLACK‟S LAW DICTIONARY 622
(9th ed. 2009). That is to say, “[w]hen a litigant takes an
unequivocal position at trial, he cannot on appeal assume a
contrary position simply because the decision in retrospect
was a tactical mistake, or perhaps a candid but regretted
concession.” Fleck v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 981 F.2d 107,
116-17 (3d Cir. 1992). Lima‟s representation in the joint
letter was neither “an unequivocal position” on this issue nor
an invitation to the District Court to rule against him.
Therefore, Lima did not waive the issue or invite the District
Court‟s error.
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IV
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the order of
the District Court and remand the matter for a determination
of reasonable attorney‟s fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988.
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